We propose efficient secret sharing schemes realizing general access structures. Our proposed schemes are perfect secret sharing schemes and include Shamir's (k, n)-threshold schemes as a special case. Furthermore, we show that a verifiable secret sharing scheme for general access structures is realized by one of the proposed schemes. key words: (k, n)-threshold scheme, general access structure, verifiable secret sharing scheme
Introduction
In 1979, Shamir introduced the concept of the (k, n)-threshold scheme [1] . Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme can only realize particular access structures that contain all subsets of k or more participants. Subsequently, Ito, Saito and Nishizeki proposed a secret sharing scheme realizing arbitrary access structures [2] . Secret sharing schemes realizing arbitrary access structures were studied by numerous authors. These schemes are categorized by two types. One is the scheme based on the unauthorized subsets [2] , [3] . The other is the scheme based on authorized subsets, which was proposed by Benaloh and Leichter [4] . Benaloh and Leichter's scheme can be applied to computationally secure secret sharing schemes [5] , [6] , which contrast with perfect secret sharing schemes. In the implementation of secret sharing schemes, an important issue is the number of shares distributed to each participant. However, the schemes based on authorized subsets are impractical in this respect when the size of the access structure is very large.
In this letter, we propose two efficient schemes based on authorized subsets. Our schemes are perfect secret sharing schemes and include Shamir's (k, n)-threshold schemes as a special case. This implies that our proposed schemes are optimal whenever the access structure is equal to that of a (k, n)-threshold scheme. Further, for any access structure, one of the proposed schemes is always more efficient than Benaloh and Leichter's scheme. The other can realize the verifiable secret sharing scheme for general access structures efficiently. 
Preliminaries

Secret Sharing Scheme
Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n } be a set of n participants. Let D( P) denote a dealer who selects a secret and distribute a share to each participant. Let K and S denote a secret set and a share set, respectively. The access structure Γ(⊂ 2 P ) is the family of subsets of P which contains the sets of participants qualified to recover the secret. Let Γ 0 be a family of the minimal sets in Γ, called the minimal access structure. For any access structure Γ, there is a family of setsΓ = 2 P − Γ. Γ contains the sets of participants unqualified to recover the secret. The family of maximal sets inΓ is denoted byΓ 1 .
Let p K be a probability distribution on K. Let p S(A) be a probability distribution on the shares S(A) given to a subset A ⊂ P. A secret sharing scheme is perfect if
where H(K) and H(K|A) denote the entropy of p K and the conditional entropy defined by the joint probability distribution p K×S(A) , respectively. It is known that Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme is perfect [7] , [8] .
In general, the efficiency of a secret sharing scheme is measured by the information rate ρ [7] defined as ρ = min{ρ i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, ρ i = log |K|/ log |S(P i )| where S(P i ) denotes the set of possible shares that P i might receive. Obviously, a high information rate is desirable. Throughout the paper, p and q denote large primes such that p divides q − 1. Let Z p be a finite field with p elements. Let g be an element of order p of multiplicative group Z * q . We assume
Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme
Here, we explain the verifiable secret sharing scheme proposed by Feldman [9] . This scheme can verify the authenticity of the shares of Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme. This scheme is described as follows: 
where
is a polynomial over Z p .
D publishes
In this scheme, P i can verify the authenticity of s i by checking
Benaloh and Leichter's Scheme
For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, K ∈ K and Γ, Benaloh and Leichter's secret sharing scheme is described as follows [4] .
Benaloh and Leichter's Scheme:
A disadvantage of this scheme is that the number of shares distributed to each participant becomes large as the size of Γ 0 gets large.
Proposed Scheme I
Benaloh and Leichter's scheme needs shares for each minimal authorized subset. On the other hand, the proposed scheme I does not need to generate shares corresponding to the minimal authorized subsets whose sizes are more than l + 1, where l is the largest size of unauthorized subsets. As a result, the proposed scheme I can reduce the number of shares distributed to each participant.
For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, K ∈ K and Γ, the proposed scheme I is described as follows.
Proposed Scheme I:
Let P = {P ∈ X : X ∈ Γ 0 and |X| > l} and n = |P |.
Compute n shares S = {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n } for the secret K by using Shamir's (l + 1, n )-threshold scheme. Then, one distinct share in S is assigned to each P ∈ P .
For every
Example 1: For P = {P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 }, consider the following access structure Γ 0 = {A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A 8 } where
First, we consider Benaloh and Leichter's scheme. In this case, shares are distributed as follows: 
Next, we consider the proposed scheme I. Since l = 3, we have Γ 0 = {A 1 , A 2 , A 3 }. In this case, we have P = P . Compute 6 shares S = {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s 6 } for the secret K by using Shamir's (4, 6)-threshold scheme. For A 1 , A 2 and A 3 , compute shares as follows:
where s 6+i, j is computed by using Shamir's (|A i |, |A i |)-threshold scheme with K as a secret (1 ≤ i ≤ 3, 1 ≤ j ≤ |A i |). In this case, shares are distributed as follows: In this example, the proposed scheme I does not require shares corresponding to authorized subsets A 4 , A 5 , · · · , A 8 . Next, we compare the information rates of various schemes which can realize general access structures. For the access structure of Example 1, the information rates of various schemes are described in Table 1 . This result shows that the proposed scheme I is the most efficient among various schemes.
Here, we show some properties of the proposed scheme I.
Theorem 1: For any access structure Γ, the proposed Table 1 Comparison of information rates for Γ 0 .
Information rate Proposed scheme I 1/3 Proposed scheme II 1/4 Benaloh and Leichter's scheme [4] 1/5 Ito, Saito and Nishizeki's scheme [2] 1/9 Tochikubo's scheme I in [3] 1/19 Tochikubo's scheme II in [3] 1/7 scheme I is a perfect secret sharing scheme.
Theorem 2: Let P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }. If Γ = {A ∈ 2 P : |A| ≥ k}, then the proposed scheme I coincides with Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let X S denote the shares in S assigned to X ⊂ P. Similarly, let X S i denote the shares in S i assigned to X (1 ≤ i ≤ d) . At first, we show H(K|X) = 0 for any X ∈ Γ. (Case i) X ∈ Γ and |X| ≥ l + 1: Since s 1 , · · · , s n are shares computed by Shamir's (l + 1, n )-threshold scheme, we immediately obtain
(Case ii) X ∈ Γ and |X| ≤ l: From the property of the access structure and the definition of Γ 0 , there exists A i ∈ Γ 0 such that A i ⊂ X. Since s n +i,1 , · · · , s n +i,|A i | are shares computed by Shamir's (|A i |, |A i |)-threshold scheme, we immediately obtain
Since H(K|X) ≥ 0 is obvious, we have H(K|X) = 0 for any X ∈ Γ.
Next we show H(K|X) = H(K) for any X Γ. For any X ∈Γ, we have |X| ≤ l. This implies
H(K|X S ) = H(K).
From the property of the access structure and the definition of Γ 0 , for any A i ∈ Γ 0 , we have A i X.
Thus, we have H(K|X S i ) = H(K). This implies
H(X S i |K) = H(X S i ). (4) In order to show H(K|X) = H(K), we expand H(K|X) as follows:
From the chain rule for entropy, we have
Here, ( * ) comes from the fact that X S 1 , · · · , X S d and X S are mutually independent, and the last equality comes from (4).
On the other hand, we have
Substituting (3), (6) and (7) into (5),
we obtain H(K|X) ≥ H(K). Since H(K|X) ≤ H(K) is obvious, we have H(K|X) = H(K).
Proof of Theorem 2:
In this access structure, we have l = k − 1, n = n and Γ 0 = φ. Then, S = {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s n } is obtained by using Shamir's (l + 1, n )-threshold scheme, and one distinct share in S is assigned to each P ∈ P. Thus, the proposed scheme I coincides with Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme.
Proposed Scheme II
The proposed scheme II is not as efficient as the the proposed scheme I. However, we can apply the proposed scheme II to a verifiable secret sharing scheme. For P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, K ∈ K and Γ, the proposed scheme II is described as follows.
Proposed Scheme II:
1. Let Γ 0 = {A ∈ Γ 0 : |A| ≤ l}, where l = max B∈Γ |B| and represent it as
Example 2:
We shall realize the access structure of Example 1 by the proposed scheme II. Since n = 6, l = 3 and t = 4, compute 10 shares S = {s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s 10 } for the secret K by using Shamir's (4, 10)-threshold scheme. Since t > 0, choose T i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3) as follows:
For s 7 , · · · , s 10 , compute shares as follows:
S 4 = {s 10,1 , s 10,2 , s 10,3 }.
In this case, shares are distributed as follows: In this example, the proposed scheme II is more efficient than Benaloh and Leichter's scheme. Actually, the information rate of the proposed scheme II is 1/4. However, the proposed scheme II requires additional shares for A 1 . Thus, the proposed scheme II is not more efficient than the the proposed scheme I.
Here, we show some properties of the proposed scheme II.
Theorem 3: For any access structure Γ, the proposed scheme II is a perfect secret sharing scheme.
Theorem 4: Let
P : |A| ≥ k}, then the proposed scheme II coincides with Shamir's (k, n)-threshold scheme.
Theorems 3 and 4 can be proved in a similar manner as the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 by using the technique developed in [3] , and we omit the proof.
Next, we propose a verifiable secret sharing scheme based on the proposed scheme II. By this scheme, a forged share contributed by a cheating participant can be detected when a group recovers the secret. To this end, a dealer has only to publish
where a 1 , · · · , a l are coefficients of the l degree polynomial which determines the shares in S . When a group X recovers the secret K, at first, the group verifies the authenticity of s i by checking
where P i ∈ X. If (8) holds, the group recovers every s such that s ∈ T j and A j ⊂ X. Next, the group verifies the authenticity of s in a similar manner as (8) . In this way, we can verify the authenticity of the shares in S though we cannot verify the authenticity of the shares in S j (1 ≤ j ≤ t). As a result, this scheme can verify whether the recovered secret is correct or not. Lastly, we consider the efficiency of verifiable secret sharing schemes. When we apply Benaloh and Leichter's scheme to verifiable schemes, the number of public data for verification is X∈Γ 0 |X| since for each X ∈ Γ 0 we use Shamir's (|X|, |X|)-threshold scheme with K as a secret independently. On the other hand, when we apply the proposed scheme II, the number of public data for verification is l + 1 since for each X ∈ Γ 0 we use Shamir's (|X|, |X|)-threshold scheme with one of the shares in S as a secret. In other words, we have only to publish the information for the polynomial with degree l which determines the shares in S . Thus, the proposed scheme II can realize verifiable schemes for general access structures efficiently. It should be noted that the number of public data for verification is l+1+ X∈Γ 0 |X| when we apply the proposed scheme I, which comes from the fact that we use Shamir's (|X|, |X|)-threshold scheme with K as a secret for each X ∈ Γ 0 independently as well as Shamir's (l + 1, n )-threshold scheme.
Evaluation of Efficiency
In this section, we investigate the efficiency of the proposed schemes. Let N 0 (P) be the number of shares distributed to P ∈ P by using Benaloh and Leichter's scheme. Similarly, let N 1 (P) and N 2 (P) be the number of shares distributed to P ∈ P by using the proposed schemes I and II, respectively. Then, the information rate of Benaloh and Leichter's scheme is given by 1/ max P∈P N 0 (P). Similarly, the information rates of the proposed schemes I and II are 1/ max P∈P N 1 (P) and 1/ max P∈P N 2 (P), respectively.
Since the proposed scheme I does not need to generate shares corresponding to X ∈ Γ 0 such that |X| > l and needs one additional share for P ∈ {P ∈ X : X ∈ Γ 0 and |X| > l}, for any P ∈ P, we have N 1 (P) = N 0 (P) − |{X ∈ Γ 0 : |X| > l, P ∈ X}| − 1 + ,
where |x| + = max{0, x}. This implies that for any access structure, the proposed scheme I is always more efficient than Benaloh and Leichter's scheme. On the other hand, the proposed scheme II requires additional shares for X ∈ Γ 0 such that |X| < l. Thus, for any P ∈ P, we have 
The last term of (10) comes from the fact that the proposed scheme II needs one additional share for every P ∈ P. (10) implies that the proposed scheme II is not as efficient as the the proposed scheme I but the proposed schemes II is more efficient than Benaloh and Leichter's scheme when |{X ∈ Γ 0 : |X| > l}| is large. Lastly, for P = {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P n }, we consider two access structures such that Γ = {X ⊂ P : |X| ≥ k}, Γ = {X ⊂ P : |X| ≥ k} ∪ {{P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P k−1 }}.
Γ is the access structure of a (k, n)-threshold scheme. Γ is the access structure which cannot be realized by a (k, n)-threshold scheme. Then, the information rates for these access structures are described in Table 2 . For the access structures as mentioned above, the proposed schemes I and II are more efficient than Benaloh and Leichter's scheme.
